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I. INTRODUCTION 
On July 21, 2010, in response to the global financial crisis that began in 
2008, President Barack Obama signed into law The Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act1 (Dodd-Frank), which effected a 
“sweeping overhaul of the financial regulatory system, a transformation on a scale 
not seen since the reforms that followed the Great Depression.”2  
Section 922,3 Dodd-Frank’s far-reaching whistleblower provision, and the 
subsequent final whistleblower rules promulgated by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”), garnered substantial business media attention4 stemming 
from one dramatic contention:  internal reporting of misconduct is not a 
prerequisite to external reporting, and the failure to do so does not preclude 
eligibility for a bounty award.5 
With the expanded federal whistleblower provisions under Dodd-Frank—
particularly the design for astronomical bounties and the circumvention of 
internal reporting mechanisms—members of the corporate community have 
                                                
* Rachel Taylor is an associate with Quarles & Brady, LLP in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, where she 
practices in the Corporate Services Group.  She is a 2013 graduate of Marquette University Law 
School, summa cum laude, and a 2008 graduate of Emory University, with distinction.  She would like 
to thank Professor Nadelle Grossman of Marquette University Law School for her support and 
guidance with writing and publishing this article. 
1 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376, 1841-42 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5301) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank]. 
2 Press Release, The White House, Remarks by the President on 21st Century Financial Regulatory 
Reform (June 17, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-
the-President-on-Regulatory-Reform. 
3 § 922, 124 Stat. at 1841-42. 
4 See Jessica Luhrs, Encouraging Litigation: Why Dodd-Frank Goes Too Far in Eliminating the Procedural 
Difficulties in Sarbanes-Oxley, 8 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 175, 176 (2012). 
5 See id. at 182-83. 
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mounted significant opposition and distaste.6  The reality of the new 
whistleblower scheme has driven organizations to revisit their internal reporting 
systems in a desperate attempt to preempt external reporting to the SEC, despite 
the impossibility of this task.7   
With employees being encouraged to report directly to the SEC, the 
Dodd-Frank era also prompts organizations to question the effectiveness of their 
corporate culture as well as their ability to persevere in an environment in which 
they are heavily undermined.8  In particular, as internal reporting mechanisms 
within the corporation continue to be circumvented, corporations are bound to 
realize a significant decline in the overall levels of trust and commitment to 
internal compliance, both essential components of a thriving, positive corporate 
culture.9  Until stronger measures are taken to fully support the internal workings 
of an organization, our nation will not experience the utmost prevention and 
detection of securities law violations.  
This Comment maintains that Dodd-Frank’s failure to meaningfully 
support internal reporting has an injurious effect on corporate cultures of trust 
and compliance.  Part II presents details regarding the whistleblower provisions 
of Dodd-Frank.  Part III discusses and defines corporate culture and offers 
particular emphasis on the importance of trust and compliance as components of 
organizational culture.  Part IV assesses the specific erosions of corporate cultures 
of trust and compliance resulting from Dodd-Frank.  Part V proposes a 
procedural mechanism in the form of an affirmative defense to reward firms for 
establishing an effective corporate culture of trust and compliance.  Part VI offers 
concluding remarks.   
 
 
 
                                                
6 See Luis Calvo, Dodd-Frank Wets Whistles, FORDHAM CORP. LAW FORUM, February 14, 2012, 
http://fordhamcorporatecenter.org/2012/02/14/dodd-frank-wets-whistles/. 
7 See Michael D. Greenberg, For Whom the Whistle Blows: Advancing Corporate Compliance and 
Integrity Efforts in the Era of Dodd Frank 13 RAND CORP. (2011), available at 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/conf_proceedings/2011/RAND_CF290.pdf 
[hereinafter Symposium]. 
8 See id. 
9 See id. 
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II. DODD-FRANK FINANCIAL REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION 
ACT 
A. The Whistleblower Scheme 
Among the new rules and regulations of Dodd-Frank is § 922,10 which 
entices whistleblowers to come forward to externally report securities law 
violations.11  How is this accomplished?  Section 922 obliges the SEC to award 
significant bounties to individuals who offer particular information to the SEC 
regarding securities violations,12 and it provides superior anti-retaliation 
protections in the employment context for individuals who provide the SEC with 
such information13—notably, these anti-retaliation protections are only afforded 
to employees who report the information externally.14 
Enacted to promote the effective and efficient detection of securities law 
violations, § 922 of Dodd-Frank amends the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(the “Exchange Act”) by adding § 21F, entitled “Securities Whistleblower 
Incentives and Protection.”15  Pursuant to § 21F, the SEC took a largely pro-
whistleblower approach to defining terms, detailing the scope of eligibility, and 
clarifying procedures for obtaining awards.16  The SEC is required to pay an 
award between ten and thirty percent of sanctions imposed to whistleblowers 
who (1) voluntarily provide the SEC, (2) with original information, (3) that leads 
to successful enforcement by the SEC, (4) and results in monetary sanctions of 
more than $1 million.17  
 While Dodd-Frank defines original information, the SEC’s final rules 
further limit what will be considered “original” information.18  According to the 
rules, the information must be: (1) based on the whistleblower’s own knowledge 
                                                
10 § 922, 124 Stat. at 1841-42. 
11 § 922(b) & (c), 124 Stat. at 1842-43. 
12 Id. 
13 See § 922(h) & (c), 124 Stat. at 1845-46. 
14 Id. 
15 § 922, 124 Stat. at 1841. 
16 For further analysis, see Heather Jones, The Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program: An Analysis of 
Proposed and Final Rules, 2 AM. U. LABOR & EMP. L.F. 131 (2011). 
17 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-3 (2010); § 922(b), 124 Stat. at 1842. 
18 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b) (2010). 
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or analysis, (2) not already known to the Commission from a separate source, and 
(3) not exclusively derived from an allegation made in a prior hearing, report, 
investigation, or news story.19  
 A whistleblower provides original information that leads to a “successful 
enforcement” action when the SEC brings a successful judicial or administrative 
action based on the information provided in one of several circumstances:20 (1) 
the information provided to the SEC was sufficiently specific, credible, and timely 
to prompt the SEC to launch an examination, open an investigation, or reopen a 
prior investigation;21 (2) the information pertained to conduct that was already 
under examination or investigation by the SEC, and the tip significantly 
contributed to the success of the action;22 and (3) the whistleblower internally 
reported the information before or at the same time as he or she reported that 
information to the SEC and the entity later self-reports the information.23 
Ultimately, if all criteria are met, the determination of the amount of an 
award is in the discretion of the SEC;24 however, the amount of the award is 
certain to be between ten percent and thirty percent of the amount of sanctions 
collected by the SEC or other authorities.25 
B. Internal Reporting Under Dodd-Frank  
 Although many people—particularly members of the business 
community—urged the SEC to require whistleblowers to first report information 
through internal reporting procedures, the final rules adopted by the SEC do not 
require employees to report information internally before reporting directly to the 
SEC.26  In fact, those rules expressly reject the notion of mandatory internal 
reporting.27  Instead, the SEC tried to ameliorate corporate concerns by allegedly 
                                                
19 See id. 
20 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(c) (2010).  
21 17§ 240.21F-4(c)(1). 
22 § 240.21F-4(c)(2). 
23 § 240.21F-4(c)(3). 
2417 C.F.R. § 240.21F-5(a) (2010). 
25 17 § 240.21F-5(b). 
26 See Press Release, SEC Adopts Rules to Establish Whistleblower Program (May 25, 2011), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-116.htm [hereinafter SEC Adopts Rules]. 
27 See id.  
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promoting internal reporting through alternative incentives intended to encourage 
employees to make use of their own company’s internal compliance programs.28 
 Among these supposed incentives, the final rules deem a whistleblower 
eligible for a bounty if the whistleblower first reports internally and the company 
later self-reports to the SEC regarding the same violations.29  However, these 
incentives have little practical effect as the rules provide significant monetary 
incentives for employees to withhold information from a company— withholding 
information permits monetary sanctions to grow.30 
Additionally, if an employee first reports internally, and subsequently 
provides the same “original information” to the SEC within a 120-day grace 
period, the final rules treat an employee as providing “original information” if the 
information is not already known to the SEC as of the date the employee 
reported internally.31  Thus, employees are able to maintain their “place in line” 
for a potential bounty even after first reporting the information internally.32 
The SEC also has authority to use its discretion in setting bounty amounts 
to encourage whistleblowers to use internal compliance procedures before 
reporting directly to the SEC.33 As such, a whistleblower’s voluntary use of an 
entity’s internal reporting system is a factor that can increase the amount of the 
bounty.34  Conversely, a whistleblower’s obstruction of an internal reporting 
system is a factor that can decrease the amount of the bounty.35  In reality, this 
incentive is a “mere half measure” that does little to encourage internal reporting; 
                                                
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Letter from David Hirschmann to Elizabeth Murphy, Secretary of U.S. Securities Exchange 
Commission (Feb. 15, 2011), at 2-3, available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-
145.pdf. 
31 See Steven J. Pearlman, New Whistleblower Policies and Incentives: A Paradigm Shift from “Oversight” to 
“Insight”, at 38, in Symposium, For Whom the Whistle Blows: Advancing Corporate Compliance 
and Integrity Efforts in the Era of Dodd Frank, May 11, 2011, available at 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/conf_proceedings/2011/RAND_CF290.pdf 
[hereinafter Whistle Blows]. 
 
 
32 See id. 
33 See SEC Adopts Rules, supra note 26. 
34 See id. 
35 Id. 
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the possibility of a subjective increase in the reward for internal reporting is not 
enough to combat the large risk of company remediation efforts and the resulting 
decrease or elimination of the bounty.36  The SEC’s refusal to make access to 
whistleblower bounties contingent on first reporting instances of misconduct 
internally invited significant controversy in the corporate community about the 
damaging effects on corporate culture, discussed in the following sections of this 
paper.37 
III. CORPORATE CULTURE 
The Dodd-Frank whistleblower scheme and its potential for enormous 
bounties gives rise to a number of detrimental consequences, including an 
evisceration of corporate culture.38  To provide a platform on which this 
consequence can be analyzed, this section discusses the definition of corporate 
culture as well as the importance of developing a corporate culture of trust and 
compliance. 
A. Corporate Culture Defined 
Historically, the anthropological field lacks consensus as to the meaning 
of culture, and naturally, its application in the corporate context also varies to a 
large extent.39  Because corporate culture is heavily influenced by industry, 
geographic location, and a plethora of other factors, the term has been defined in 
countless ways.40  However, in a formal sense, the term corporate culture has 
generated a few distinct meanings, including: the shared beliefs, values, 
experiences, attitudes, and processes that contribute to the unique environment of 
an organization and are widely shared and strongly held throughout the 
organization; the glue that holds organizations together by providing cohesiveness 
and coherence among the parts; and “the pattern of arrangement, material or 
behavior which has been adopted by a [corporation] … as the accepted way of 
                                                
36 James J. DiGiulio, The Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program: A Blown Opportunity 17 (2011), 
http://www.mdmc-law.com/index.cfm/about/articles-updates/. 
37 See Whistle Blows, supra note 31, at 34. 
38 Id. 
39 See Jeffrey Kerr & John W. Slocum, Jr., Managing Corporate Culture through Reward Systems, 19 
ACAD. OF MGMT. EXECUTIVE 130, 130 (2005); Linda Smircich, Concepts of Culture and Organizational 
Analysis, 28 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 339, 339 (1983). 
40 Golnaz Sadri & Brian Lees, Developing Corporate Culture as a Competitive Advantage, 20 J. OF MGMT. 
DEV. 853, 854 (2001). 
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solving problems.41  More informally, and perhaps in more useful jargon, 
corporate culture has been readily described as “how we do things around here.”42  
Conversely, corporate culture is not a multitude of controls, nor is it a list of rules 
and regulations.43  
Despite its intangible nature, corporate culture manifests in virtually every 
aspect of corporate behavior.44  The collection of past and current philosophies 
that comprises corporate culture pervades the corporation’s appearance and 
reputation, business strategies, internal policies and procedures, community and 
customer relations, and expectations for growth and development.45  Corporate 
culture also permeates the way in which a corporation treats its employees, the 
strength of employee dedication towards corporate goals and objectives, and the 
values and beliefs of a corporate culture, which “foster[s] norms that influence 
employees’ behavior.”46  Corporate culture even impacts the way in which the 
corporate office looks, the names of the conference rooms, corporate slogans, 
and how employees dress.47 
Moreover, corporate culture generally promotes several distinguishable 
beliefs and values.48  Numerous Fortune 500 companies have successfully 
developed and maintained strong corporate cultures that advance values such as 
excellent customer service,49 open and honest communication,50 diversity,51 
philanthropy and community participation,52 and informality and fun.53  
                                                
41 See id.; Organizational Culture Definition, BUSINESSDICTIONARY.COM, 
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/organizational-culture.html (last visited March 13, 
2012) [hereinafter Organizational Culture]. 
42 Shili Sun, Organizational Culture and Its Themes, 3 INT. J. OF BUS. & MGMT. 137, 137 (2008). 
43 See Margaret M. Towle, “Culture of Compliance” from an Organizational Theory Perspective, 20 THE 
MONITOR, Nov./ Dec. 2005, at 3, available at 
http://professional.financialcounsel.com/News/Economics/IMCA/2005/IMCA_11-1205.pdf. 
44 See Organizational Culture, supra note 41. 
45 See id. 
46 See id.; Kerr & Slocum, supra note 39, at 130.  
47 See generally Organizational Culture, supra note 41. 
48 See Towle, supra note 43, at 5. 
49 See Robert Reiss, Driving a Global Corporate Culture of 1.4 Million Employees, FORBES (March 5, 
2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertreiss/2012/03/05/driving-a-global-corporate-culture-
of-1-4-million-employees/. 
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Regardless of the values and beliefs the firm chooses to promote, a 
successful corporate strategy must embody a strong corporate culture of trust and 
compliance.  In turn, these are discussed next. 
B. Trust as a Component of Corporate Culture 
Creating, building, and sustaining trust are essential components of 
fostering a positive corporate culture within an organization.54  An organization is 
unable to foster a corporate culture of compliance55 without first nurturing a 
corporate culture of employees being able to trust the corporation.56  However, 
while trust—like culture—is difficult to define, experts commonly describe trust 
as “a state of mind that enables its possessor to be willing to make herself 
vulnerable to another . . . .”57 Organizations whose members trust each other 
often experience superior performance, while organizations whose members do 
not trust each other are more prone to competitive failures.58  Moreover, 
organizations that promote trust relationships among corporate participants can 
significantly reduce, if not eliminate, the costs associated with controlling 
opportunistic behavior.59  
                                                                                                                           
50 E.g., Corporate Vision, Philosophy and Financial Objectives, MACY’S, INC. (Apr. 17, 2012),  
http://www.macysinc.com/AboutUs/Vision/default.aspx . 
51 E.g., Our People, GENERAL ELECTRIC (Apr. 17, 2012), 
http://www.ge.com/company/culture/people.html. 
52 See e.g., Cultivating a Corporate Culture of Giving, LOS ALTOS TOWN CRIER (Feb. 15, 2012), available 
at 
http://www.losaltosonline.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=42323&Itemid
=198. 
53 See Sadri & Lees, supra note 40, at 857. 
54 See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of 
Corporate 
Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1758 (2001). 
55 See infra Part III.D. 
56 See Elleta Sangrey Callahan et. al., Integrating Trends in Whistleblowing and Corporate Governance: 
Promoting Organizational Effectiveness, Societal Responsibility, and Employee Empowerment, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 
177, 191 (2002). 
57 Claire A. Hill & Erin Ann O’Hara, A Cognitive Theory of Trust, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1717, 1724 
(2006). 
58 See id. at 1753. 
59 See id. at 1757. 
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There are many facets to developing a culture of trust within an 
organization.60  First and foremost, the adoption of formal policies and 
procedures, such as a code of ethics—accompanied with a strong commitment to 
upholding these policies and procedures—promotes trust by defining core values 
and the role of employees in carrying them out.61  Moreover, clear policies permit 
corporate participants to become familiar with group norms, achieve cohesion, 
and bring together individual interests with group welfare.62  Secondly, 
organizations must promote clear communication channels, establish open door 
policies, and encourage the challenging of norms in all realms of corporate 
decision-making.63  A general encouragement of questioning, without fear of 
retaliation—especially with regard to legal compliance—should pervade the 
corporate culture.64  Unrestricted communication not only promotes trust but 
also helps to reassure employees that reporting internally is encouraged and 
valued.65  Lastly, organizations must live and breathe a commitment to an 
environment where members treat each other well and where teamwork and unity 
are used as a means to achieving company goals.66  Where collaboration and 
teamwork are encouraged, not only are employees more likely to act ethically, but 
they are also more likely to develop trust in internal reporting mechanisms.67  
 
 
 
                                                
60 See Callahan, supra note 56, at 199-201. 
61 See id. at 201-03. 
62 Id. at 207-08. 
63 See Carl Oliver & Francis Daly, Encouraging Internal Whistleblowing (And More!), 
http://www.scu.edu/ethics/practicing/focusareas/business/whistleblowing-update.html (last 
visited Mar. 19, 2012). 
64 Carl R. Oliver & Francis J. Daly, Encouraging Internal Whistleblowing (And More!), SANTA CLARA 
UNIV., June 2007, http://www.scu.edu/ethics/practicing/focusareas/business/whistleblowing-
update.html. 
65 See Callahan, supra note 56, at 208. 
66 See id. 
67 See generally Tom Taulli, Why Corporate America’s New Asset is Ethics, and Enforcement of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Ought to Help the Stock Market, FINDLAW (Jan. 14, 2003), 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20030114_taulli.html. 
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C. Legal Compliance as a Component of Corporate Culture 
Corporate compliance “has traditionally been understood as conformity 
or obedience to regulations and legislation.”68  However, with the recent global 
financial crisis, and the resulting shareholder, stakeholder, and community 
scrutiny, contemporary understandings of corporate compliance is becoming 
much more expansive in scope.69  As such, corporate compliance is no longer 
viewed merely as a legal obligation that must be fulfilled, but also has developed 
into an integral component of corporate culture.70  Specifically, a culture of 
compliance is a phrase habitually used to refer to a culture that promotes 
compliance with applicable laws, regulations, and policies among employees at all 
levels of the corporation.71  Compliance executives point toward culture as a 
critical priority for building successful compliance initiatives.72  Additionally, 
behavioral science indicates that a corporate culture of compliance is “the single 
most effective, measurable driver of compliant behavior [that]…works ‘when no 
one is looking.’”73  
Ultimately, it is not enough to have policies and procedures in place.  To 
be successful, compliance must be embedded into the entity’s corporate culture.74  
It is well established that to cultivate a corporate culture of compliance 
corporations must first and foremost comply with the standards set forth in the 
                                                
68 Lisa Interligi, Compliance Culture: A Conceptual Framework, 16 J. OF MGMT. & ORG. 235, 235-36 
(2004). 
69 See id. at 235. 
70 See id. at 236. 
71 Id. 
72 Corporate Culture is the Top Priority for Ethics & Compliance Leaders in 2011, LRN Study Says, 
CORPORATE COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS (May 3, 2011), 
http://www.corporatecomplianceinsights.com/news/corporate-culture-is-the-top-priority-for-
ethics-compliance-leaders-in-2011-lrn-study-says/. 
73 News announcement from Bryan Cave, Command, Control, Culture and Compliance: 
Behavioral Science Findings on Corporate Culture, Employee Compliance and Reporting (June 
14, 2012), http://www.bryancave.com/newsevents/events/detail.aspx?event=1145. 
74 Lori A. Richards, Director, Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, Speech by SEC Staff: The Culture of Compliance (Apr. 23, 
2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch042303lar.htm [hereinafter Richards 
Speech]. 
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Federal Sentencing Guidelines75 (the “Sentencing Guidelines”) and Sarbanes-
Oxley of 2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley”).76  From there, a corporation must advance a 
culture that equates corporate success with acting in a compliant manner.77  That 
is, it must have a strategic vision that incorporates compliance.78  According to 
the SEC, a culture of compliance should also identify specific risks that could 
arise within this strategic vision and establish control points for each of these 
risks.79  Additionally, although a culture of compliance cannot be built overnight, 
it can be developed over time with a permeating “value from top to bottom that 
encourages compliance with the law.”80  Thus, there must be a visible dedication 
and support by senior management.81  Correspondingly, there must be specific 
people from top to bottom that are accountable for building the corporate culture 
of compliance.82  Finally, a corporation fosters a culture of compliance not only 
through the promotion of legal compliance behavior but also through exuding 
fundamental values such as trust, which is strongly linked to employee 
performance and corporate commitment.83  
D. The Importance of a Corporate Culture of Trust and Compliance 
Legally, building a culture of trust and compliance has many benefits, 
including the lessening of potential civil and criminal liability under the 
Sentencing Guidelines and Sarbanes-Oxley.84  “Public policy [, as exemplified 
                                                
75 See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8 (2012), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2012_Guidelines/Manual_PDF/Chapter_8.pdf (describing the 
sentencing of organizational defendants). 
76 See generally Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2003). 
77 See Australian Competition & Consumer Commission, Trade Practices Compliance Programs, 
http://www.accc.gov.au/media-release/guide-to-corporate-trade-practices-compliance-programs 
(last visited Sept. 22, 2013). 
78 See Richards Speech, supra note 74. 
79 Id. 
80 Trade Practices and Fair Trading: Developing a Compliance Program for Trade Practices, DIYCOMPLY, 
http://www.diycomply.net/ssl/Subscription1.2/index-3_TPA_CreateCulture.aspx. 
81 Stephany Watson, Fostering Positive Corporate Culture in the Post-Enron Era, 6 TRANSACTIONS: 
TENN. J. BUS. L. 7, 38 (2004). 
82 See id. 
83 See supra Part III.B; Interligi, supra note 68, at 235. 
84 See Watson, supra note 81, at 31-32. 
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through these federal laws,] has long supported internal compliance and reporting 
systems.85  In enacting these policies, the federal government recognized that a 
culture of trust and compliance encourages employees to report questionable 
conduct and “cultivates a system by which companies can stop wrongdoing 
promptly and take appropriate remedial action expeditiously.”86  At the same 
time, this allows companies to enhance their internal policies and procedures in 
an effort to curb future wrongful behavior.87 
Aside from the legal motivations for developing a culture of trust and 
compliance, corporations have ample business incentives—both financial and 
non-financial—to foster a resilient and positive corporate culture of trust and 
compliance.88  An organization that prioritizes a culture of trust and compliance 
not only tends to be more enjoyable to work for, but also is likely to experience 
“increased levels of teamwork, sharing of information, and openness to new 
ideas.”89  Increased interaction among employees spurs open and honest 
communication and a continuous flow of information throughout the 
corporation.90  Moreover, this environment of teamwork and information sharing 
contributes to an employee perception of trustworthiness, and consequently, 
enhanced employee morale.91   
Furthermore, corporate culture that supports trust and compliance is a 
critical element of successful enterprise risk management for employees and 
shareholders.92  Ample evidence suggests that—in corporations supporting a 
culture of trust and compliance—employees who have a substantial interest in 
their compensation are more likely to be innovative and cost-conscious, and thus, 
                                                
85 Letter from Donna Dabney to Elizabeth Murphy, Secretary of U.S. Securities Exchange 
Commission (Dec. 17. 2010), at 9, available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-
10/s73310.shtml [hereinafter Dabney Letter]. 
86 Id. 
87 See id. 
88 See generally id. at 8-9. 
89 Sadri & Lees, supra note 40, at 856 (citation omitted). 
90 See id. 
91 See generally Watson, supra note 81, at 31-32. 
92 Carlo V. di Florio, Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, Speech by SEC Staff: The Role of Compliance and Ethics in Risk 
Management (Oct. 17, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch101711cvd.htm. 
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compliant organizations tend to be more profitable.93  Many corporate leaders 
find that a strong ethical culture benefits the bottom line, with studies showing a 
direct relationship between ethics and compliance practices and the strength of 
numerous business success indicators, such as stock price.94  A culture of trust 
and compliance has also been linked with enhanced financial and sales 
performance, greater access to capital, strengthened brand image, positive 
community relations, improved shareholder relations, improved relations with 
regulatory authorities, and overcoming pressure from activist groups.95 
III. DODD-FRANK UNDERMINES CORPORATE CULTURE 
A. Erosions of Trust 
 Traditional analysis has asserted that external legal and market incentives 
are the driving force of “discouraging opportunistic behavior” and encouraging 
organizational trust and cooperation.96  Recently, however, social science has 
demonstrated that external financial incentives are indeed less of a motivating 
source for governing organizational behavior than the phenomenon of internal 
trust.97  Although distinguishable from the realities of the business world, social 
science has effectively compiled data from social dilemma games to reveal 
behavioral patterns in the organizational realm.98  These games demonstrate that 
trust is not always most effectively promoted by promising external rewards, and 
in reality, external incentives can reduce levels of trust within an organization by 
diminishing internal motivations.99  As such, Dodd-Frank’s advancement of 
external rewards and incentives for whistleblowers that report securities violations 
directly to the SEC without reporting first to the organization reduces the overall 
level of trust within organizations. 
                                                
93 See Watson, supra note 81, at 32. 
94 See The Impact of Codes of Conduct on Corporate Culture: Measuring the Immeasurable, LRN 3 (2006), 
available at  
www.ethics.org/files/u5/LRNImpactofCodesofConduct.pdf. 
95 See Watson, supra note 81, at 33.  
96 See id. at 35. 
97 Blair & Stout, supra note 54, at 1735. 
98 See id. at 1777. 
99 Id. at 1139. 
82 TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 15 
 
 
 To begin, the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions erode trust by 
removing the power of organizations to require the use of their internal reporting 
mechanisms for exposing misconduct.  Specifically, social dilemma literature 
demonstrates that formal instructions are powerful tools in determining the 
likelihood of cooperation and the existence of trust,100 especially when the formal 
instructions originate from someone who is perceived as an authoritative figure.101  
As a result of Dodd-Frank, authoritative figures within organizations are unable 
to give truly binding formal instructions—through codes of conduct, for 
example—to report misconduct within the organization in the first instance.  
Conversely, if the SEC were to explicitly support internal reporting mechanisms 
and corporate cultures of trust and compliance, organizations would have the 
backing to promote cooperation through formal instructions from internal figures 
of authority.  As the law currently stands, however, the SEC virtually removes the 
authoritative power from the corporation to promulgate effective and binding 
formal instructions for internal reporting.  As a result, a lack of cooperation with 
internal procedures, a lack of trust within the system, and an undermining of 
corporate culture is bound to follow. 
 Furthermore, the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions erode group 
identity and communication—both essential components of trust within an 
organization.  The social dilemma experiments suggest that permitting players to 
communicate with each other significantly increases the incidence of cooperation 
and feelings of group identity; conversely, the incidence of cooperation and 
feelings of group identity are dramatically decreased when players are unable to 
communicate effectively.102  In turn, Dodd-Frank’s failure to promote and 
support internal communications by allowing whistleblowers to bypass the 
internal reporting systems leads to reduced communication within the 
organization regarding concerns about potential misconduct.  Moreover, because 
of the lack of communication and sharing of information stemming from the 
desire to be the first to report original information, a “silo mentality”—an attitude 
found in organizations in which groups do not want to share information or 
knowledge—ensues.103  Social science as well as contemporary corporate 
                                                
100 In one social dilemma study, two-thirds of the group that was told they were going to play 
“The Community Game” cooperated, while only one-third of the group that was told they were 
going to play “The Wall Street” game cooperated.  See Blair & Stout, supra note 54, at 1770-71. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 1771. 
103 Silo Mentality Definition, INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/silo-
mentality.asp#axzz1qR70yvNF (last visited March 28, 2012). 
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experience suggests that a “silo mentality” inhibits feelings of group identity and 
trust and can be an overwhelming factor in the demise of corporate culture.104 
 Moreover, the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions erode trust by 
discouraging collaboration and teamwork within an organization.  The social 
dilemma experiments reveal that players are more prone to cooperate and trust 
one another in situations in which they anticipate the other players will cooperate 
as well.105  As such, the reporting mechanisms under Dodd-Frank lead to a lack of 
cooperation and trust within an organization because individuals within the 
organization are less likely to expect that other individuals will cooperate—that is, 
make use of internal reporting mechanisms.  Rather, individuals within the 
organization will naturally expect—and, in fact, Dodd-Frank encourages106—
employees to run directly to the SEC rather than internally report.  This lack of 
collaboration and teamwork to solve internal dilemmas is bound to pervade all 
levels of the corporation.  Management will expect a lack of cooperation among 
lower-level employees, lower-level employees will expect a lack of support from 
management, and employees will be less apt to turn to other employees for fear 
of giving them keys to a bounty.  By extension, Dodd-Frank converts employees 
into perceived threats rather than corporate assets and converts management into 
unsupportive , tight-lipped actors,.  This compromises employee relations and 
chills the level of trust within the organization. 
 
 
B. Erosions of Corporate Cultures of Compliance  
 Dodd-Frank erodes corporate cultures of compliance by luring employees 
to directly bypass their company’s internal compliance programs, and as a result, 
displaces long-standing federal policy prescriptions for effective and reliable 
internal reporting systems mandated by the Sentencing Guidelines and Sarbanes-
Oxley.107  Moreover, “most responsible public companies have spent a significant 
amount of time and money implementing,” promoting, and refining robust 
compliance programs that continue to serve as valuable resources for companies, 
                                                
104 Id. 
105 Blair & Stout, supra note 54, at 1771-72. 
106 See supra Part II.B. 
107 Id. 
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management, and employees.108  “While the [Dodd-Frank rules] include 
provisions ‘intended not to discourage’ whistleblowers at companies with robust 
compliance programs to first report . . . internally, they do not adequately encourage 
employees to do so.”109  Because the “whistleblower program . . . does not 
account for and fully maintain the vitality of corporate integrity programs”110 
already established in response to federal regulations—and which have proven 
effective in ensuring compliance with the law—existing corporate cultures of 
compliance within organizations “will no longer [adequately] serve the purposes 
for which they were specifically designed.”111   
 Moreover, the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions erode corporate 
cultures of compliance by undermining internal abilities to develop and maintain 
strategic visions of functional corporate compliance programs.112  The lack of 
meaningful support sends an overriding message to employees that internal 
reporting mechanisms as a whole are inadequate.113  To the extent that the 
company’s internal reporting procedures require a company to report misconduct, 
“the company’s internal processes [are] rendered meaningless if the employee” 
can acquire information and disclose it to the SEC without consequence from the 
company.114  Also, effective compliance programs rely primarily on internal 
reporting to identify instances of misconduct, to investigate the facts, and to take 
remedial actions.115  However, the likelihood to receive internal reports of 
misconduct is significantly diminished under the current law, ultimately 
weakening the compliance program that is already in place.116  Because effective 
                                                
108 Letter from Neila B. Radin to Elizabeth Murphy, Secretary of U.S. Securities Exchange 
Commission (Dec. 17. 2010), at 2, available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-
10/s73310.shtml [hereinafter Radin Letter]. 
109 Dabney Letter, supra note 85, at 2. 
110 Letter from Allstate Ins.Co., et. al.to Elizabeth Murphy, Secretary of U.S. Securities Exchange 
Commission (Dec. 17. 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310.shtml.   
111 Letter from Jeffrey W. Rubin to Elizabeth Murphy, Secretary of U.S. Securities Exchange 
Commission (Jan. 4, 2011), at 16, available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-
10/s73310.shtml [hereinafter Rubin Letter]. 
112 See Dave Ebersole, Blowing the Whistle on the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions, 6 ENTREPREN. 
BUS. L.J. 123, 139 (2011). 
113 See id. 
114 Rubin Letter, supra note 111, at 15. 
115 See id. at 16-17. 
116 See id. at 16. 
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corporate cultures of compliance naturally comprise functioning internal 
compliance programs—and because these compliance programs are weakened—
the overall effect will be a deterioration of corporate cultures of compliance.117   
Additionally, the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions erode corporate 
cultures of compliance because compliance mechanisms dwindle over time when 
they lack enduring institutional support.118  The pronouncement by the SEC that 
compliance is a consideration when determining the amount of the bounty to be 
awarded is “thin on the ground” without the direct empowerment of internal 
policies and corporate cultures of compliance.119  As such, even organizations that 
embrace the requisite “tone at the top” to foster a corporate culture of 
compliance lack the backing needed to pervade the entire organization.120  Absent 
the alignment of the law with current internal policies and procedures, the 
benefits stemming from these aspects of internal affairs—such as promoting a 
culture of compliance—will be diminished, if not eradicated.121 
Further, while some reports have indicated that the development of 
internal compliance programs is on the rise post Dodd-Frank,122 increased 
internal policing is not synonymous with a strong corporate culture of 
compliance.  Effective corporate cultures of compliance also contemplate 
employee buy-in to internal compliance efforts;123 however, the provisions 
ultimately remove the potential for this buy-in with superior monetary incentives 
and anti-retaliation protections for external reporting.  Therefore, no matter how 
                                                
117 Ebersole, supra note 112, at 139.  
118 See Whistle Blows, supra note 31, at 39-40. 
119 See Corporate Integrity in the Wake of Dodd-Frank: How Do We fortify Internal Compliance, 
Reporting, and Culture?, at 22, in Symposium, For Whom the Whistle Blows: Advancing 
Corporate Compliance and Integrity Efforts in the Era of Dodd Frank, May 11, 2011, available at 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/conf_proceedings/2011/RAND_CF290.pdf 
[hereinafter Corporate Integrity] 
120  See Exploring the New World Order: Whistleblower Challenges for Corporate Management 
and Governance, at 14 in Symposium, For Whom the Whistle Blows: Advancing Corporate 
Compliance and Integrity Efforts in the Era of Dodd Frank, May 11, 2011, available at 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/conf_proceedings/2011/RAND_CF290.pdf 
[hereinafter New World Order]. 
121 See Radin Letter, supra note 108, at 2-3. 
122 See New World Order, supra note 120, at 14. 
123 See supra Part III.C 
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much corporations attempt to vamp up their compliance efforts, these efforts 
alone are not enough to prevent erosions of corporate cultures of compliance. 
Lastly, Dodd-Frank erodes corporate cultures of compliance by 
encouraging a “mercenary mentality” among employees and diminishing the 
legitimate employer expectations of their employees to develop, maintain, and 
advance corporate cultures of compliance.124  Monetarily, the provisions 
encourage employees to withhold information from an employer when early 
company involvement and remediation efforts could either mitigate or reduce the 
resulting bounty.125  Traditionally, corporations have relied upon employees as a 
group to police the conduct within the corporation and safeguard the reputation 
of a company.126  Correspondingly, in the past, employees who chose to report 
internally generally did so out of feelings of loyalty, group belonging, and an 
overwhelming desire to help the company “root out corruption.”127  Now, the 
encouraged “mercenary mentality” will prompt employees to race to the SEC at 
the first sign of a violation rather than advance efforts to protect the reputation 
and well-being of the corporation, resulting in the erosion of a culture of 
compliance.128   
VI. PROPOSAL 
 While Dodd-Frank alleges that the whistleblower bounty provisions are 
not intended to discourage whistleblowers from first reporting misconduct 
internally to companies that have robust compliance programs, the practical effect 
of such provisions is, in fact, to diminish all internal reporting mechanisms 
relating to violations of securities laws and to undermine corporate cultures of 
trust and compliance.  Therefore, in the event of an SEC enforcement action 
resulting from an external whistleblower tip in which the information was not 
first reported internally, Dodd-Frank should be amended to permit corporations 
to establish an affirmative defense for possessing an effective, well-maintained 
                                                
124 See Corporate Integrity, supra note 119, at 21. 
125 See Letter from David Hirschmann to Elizabeth Murphy, Secretary of U.S. Securities Exchange 
Commission (Feb. 15, 2011), at 2, available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-
10/s73310.shtml. 
126 Whistle Blows, supra note 31, at 17. 
127 See Alexandre H. Rene, et al.,Anti-Corruption: Minimizing FCPA Risk on Two Fronts: Through 
Corporate Policy and Corporate Culture, BLOOMBERG LAW REPORTS: CORPORATE COUNSEL (Feb. 13, 
2012), at 1. 
128 See id. 
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corporate culture of trust and compliance.  Moreover, if the corporation is able to 
successfully establish the affirmative defense, the sanctions and monetary 
penalties imposed on the corporation will be reduced, and more significantly, 
there will be an absolute bar to the recovery of an award by a whistleblower under 
the bounty program. 
More specifically, using a preponderance of the evidence standard—in 
which a corporate culture of trust and compliance is more likely to exist than 
not—the judge will be required to engage in a full examination of all facts and 
circumstances tending to prove the existence of a corporate culture of trust and 
compliance.  However, in taking into account all facts and circumstances, the 
judge will be permitted to consider any information tending to show that internal 
whistleblowing was impractical under the circumstances.  Moreover, factors 
tending to indicate a corporate culture of trust and compliance may include, but 
are not limited to: 
1. A clearly defined code of ethics, accompanied with evidence tending to 
show a strong commitment to upholding these policies and 
procedures.129 
2. Apparent communication channels—such as reporting structures—and 
open-door policies.130 
3. Employee feedback or overall company survey results tending to 
indicate that teamwork, collaboration, and unity are valued as a means 
to achieve company goals.131 
4. A compliance program that complies with the Sentencing Guidelines 
and Sarbanes-Oxley of 2002 and is applicable to all members of the 
organization.132 
5. A permeating value from top to bottom that encourages compliance 
with the law and specific instances of visible dedication and support by 
senior management.133 
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6. Active encouragement and solicitation of employees through e-mail 
communications, placement of flyers, and posters to report potential 
violations to the company.134 
7. Specific examples of communications to employees specifying that 
those who report violations internally will not face retaliation, and 
feedback from employees who reported information internally but did 
not face retaliation.135 
8. Reward structures, either monetary or non-monetary for employees 
who significantly contribute to the values of trust and compliance. 
9. Records of effective and timely investigative follow-up and responses 
to reported and actual violations.136 
Admittedly, because the proposal does not mandate internal reporting in 
an absolute sense, critics will argue that the proposed solution “does not go far 
enough” to support internal reporting efforts.  However, this proposed solution 
promises an advantageous middle ground that entertains the goals and wishes of 
parties on each side of the whistleblower bounty provision debate.  On one hand, 
this solution creates a positive disincentive for employees to bypass effective 
internal reporting procedures.  Specifically, if an effective corporate culture of 
trust and compliance is in place, then employees will be required to make use of 
their internal reporting procedures prior to reporting to the SEC, or forego their 
prospect of a bounty.  With this in mind, employees have no incentive to 
withhold information in attempt to allow increased sanctions, as doing so will not 
provide them with a direct monetary benefit.  Furthermore, by allowing those 
entities that do embrace effective cultures to come forward with evidence 
demonstrating this type of corporate environment, there is no opportunity for the 
failure of some companies to undermine the others that have successfully 
implemented the requisite culture. 
Conversely, critics will also argue that this proposal instead goes too far, 
creating too many obstacles for external whistleblower reporting.  Unlike 
mandatory internal reporting, as urged by the corporate community, there is no 
mechanical assumption that the employer has an effective culture in place when 
                                                
134 See generally Memorandum from Huntsman Corporation to Elizabeth Murphy, Secretary of U.S. 
Securities Exchange Commission (Feb. 1, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-
33-10/s73310.shtml . 
135 See generally id. 
136 See generally id. 
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the burden of proof is placed on the employer to establish an effective corporate 
culture of trust and compliance,.  Therefore, this satisfies the concerns of those 
individuals who vehemently oppose mandatory internal reporting—namely due to 
the fact that while some employers maintain robust compliance processes and 
cultures, others lack such established procedures and protections within their 
culture.  Additionally, by allowing employers the opportunity to present such 
evidence, employers have a further incentive to make vigorous efforts to develop 
effective cultures of trust and compliance. 
Of course, critics will argue that this proposal promotes uncertainty 
among employees, as employee whistleblowers will need to make their own initial 
assessment of the effectiveness of the culture prior to deciding whether or not 
they are required to report internally.  However, the factors outlined under the 
proposed changes will provide employees with objective criteria with which to 
measure their corporate cultures of trust and compliance against.  For the few 
corporations in which the culture could sway in either direction, the practical 
effect of the law is that employees will err on the side of caution and first report 
the misconduct internally.  For the reasons mentioned in this paper, it seems the 
resulting increase in internal reporting would ultimately produce more benefits 
than harm. 
Furthermore, critics may also argue that this proposal will lead 
corporations to resort to a “check the box” mentality.  Specifically, they may 
argue that corporations will deem the task of developing an effective corporate 
culture of trust and compliance complete merely by “checking the box” under the 
list of proposed factors, when in fact the true intent of the law contemplates a 
continuous commitment.  However, the factors listed in the proposal account for 
this risk and specifically demand regular and continuous measures for 
implementing the requisite culture.  Additionally, the proposal maintains that the 
factors indicative of an effective corporate culture of trust and compliance are 
merely inclusive rather than exclusive.  As such, the judge will be in a position to 
take into account the presence of a “check the box” mentality when determining 
whether or not an effective corporate culture of trust and compliance exists.   
Lastly, critics will argue that this proposal leads to a system of 
considerable judicial discretion.  However, history has demonstrated that judges 
are rational and logical actors who can competently apply the law to the facts to 
reach an appropriate decision.137  Moreover, although the judge is not an insider 
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of the organization, the judge is in the best position to serve as a neutral party 
between the potentially competing views of the employer and employee.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
 The whistleblower provisions of Dodd-Frank create unduly powerful 
incentives for employees to bypass internal reporting mechanisms for violations 
of securities laws, generating a host of perverse effects.  An affirmative defense 
for corporations with effective cultures of trust and compliance will help to 
alleviate the concerns Dodd-Frank underscores by reinforcing the ability for 
organizations to develop, implement, and maintain strong corporate cultures and 
empowering those that do. 
 
